The paper analyses the way in which monetary and fiscal policy influences the performances of economic growth and social welfare.. The analysis is made on the basis of a dynamic model with discrete variables . The model is with a representative private agent and a government sector consisting of a consolidated fiscal authority and central bank. Households, in each period, decide about consumption., investment in physical capital, and financial investment in government bonds. The model is built in such a way that satisfaction of the budget constraint of the representative household implies satisfaction of the budget constraint of the government.
Introduction
In recent years relative effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy action on economic growth an on social welfare has been debated by both economists and policy makers.
The traditional optimal currency areas literature pointed out long ago that, in a monetary union, fiscal policy has to play a more important role in cyclical stabilization given the loss of national monetary independence. This is particularly the case if shocks are not perfectly correlated across frontiers. Fiscal flexibility, together with budgetary discipline and co-ordination, has come to be seen as a central pillar of fiscal policy in a currency area . The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has been the operational response of EU countries to the quest for budgetary discipline in EMU.
Recent theoretical and empirical developments have shed new light on the 'old' issue of the interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities.
There are numerous studies, both theoretical and empirical, analyzing the relation between inflation and long-run growth.
In the past decade the development of the endogenous growth literature pioneered by Romer (1986) , Lucas (1988) , and Rebelo (1991) has enhanced our understanding about how an economy's growth performance can be affected by public policies. For instance, Barro (1990) and King and Rebelo (1990) study the effects of fiscal policies, such as government spending and taxation, on economic growth. The general conclusion is that taxation adversely affects long-run growth performance and that the quantitative impacts are much larger than those found in exogenous growth models. Chari, Jones, and Manuelli (1995) and van der Ploeg and Alogoskoufis (1994) examine the effects of monetary policies, such as changes in the growth rates of nominal money supplyliter, on long-run real activity. These authors find support for the conventional wisdom that inflation and long-run growth are inversely related. These studies also represent an advance in our understanding of the impact of alternative policies on inflation and growth.
Recently economists have been paying increasing attention to a dynamic general equilibrium approach to the theory of price level that is often called the fiscal theory of the price level, or FTPL. This way of thinking emphasizes the role of fiscal and monetary policy in determining the risk and return properties of government liabilities. It is particularly useful in analyzing proposals for large-scale institutional changes that imply shifts in monetary and fiscal policies.
First, the literature on the monetary implications of fiscal (in)discipline, which originates with Sargent and Wallace (1981) , emphasizes that, to the extent that the path of a government's fiscal deficit is predetermined and unsustainable, then monetary policy and the price level are no longer exogenous to it. A similar point arises in the context of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (Leepe, 1991, and Woodford, 1995) . However, in these frameworks the goals of fiscal policy are not explicitly discussed, and do not include macro stabilization. Nevertheless, the scenario analysed by Sargent and Wallace has surely been influential in motivating the emphasis on fiscal discipline as a prerequisite for monetary stability, which has been placed in the Treaty of Maastricht and, in particular, on the design of the criteria for admission to the third phase of EMU.
A general survey of these issues in neoclassical models is in Chari and Kehoe (1999) . Issues of coordination also appear in models of the inflation tax or seigniorage policy (Barro, 1979; Lucas and Stokey, 1983) . In particular, Alesina and Tabellini (1987) study the desirability of fiscal and monetary policy coordination in a seigniorage model where monetary policy has no stabilization features and (expansive) fiscal policies affects output negatively.
The Structure of the Economy
In our model economy there is a representative household and a government. In each period, the government issues currency , nominal debt and fix a distortionary rate of income tax
τ to finance the level of public consumption .
t g The sequence of government budget constraints is the following:
where is the nominal interest rate paid on debt issued by the government.
t i
Technology takes the form:
where y is output and k is private capital input.
The production function of the representative agent satisfies the folowing conditions:
We will assume that the economy is closed and the markets are perfectly competitive and all prices are flexible.
Equilibrium on the goods market is:
where is consumption and is investment.
The dynamic equation of private capital is the following:
respectively.
Without loss of generality, we assumed that the depreciation rate of capital is zero.
The initial stock of currency, , the initial debt liabilities , and the initial stock of private capital, are given. A government policy is, therefore, a
, τ for . 0 ≥ t Each period, the representative household faces the following budget constraint:
We will denote by the wealth of the representative household:
According to formula (12), it follows that the dynamic equation of the wealth of the representative household is:
The specific form of the cash constraint is:
or
Relationship (15) can also be written as:
As a matter of fact, relationship (16) can be interpreted as the dynamic equation of private capital.
We notice that if the budget constraint of the representative budget (relation (8)), as well as the equilibrium equation (4) are satisfied, then equation (1), which represents the government budget constraints, is satisfied.
We shall suppose that the representative household seeks to maximize a discounted sum of utilities of the following form:
where and are increasing, concave functions, and the discount factor satisfies
We notice in relation (17) that both private consumption and public consumption are deflated by the price level . 
The Model
With the above observations and notations, the model of the representative household is:
The model (18) 
We denoted by where we denoted by R the real interest rate.
Equation (29) emphasizes the fact that the dynamics of the real consumption depends on the relationship between the discount factor and the real interest rate.
In the special case when:
we obtain, from relation 29 
and:
we obtain:
Relation (31) highlights the fact that, while the real interest rate remains constant and relation (34) is satisfied, the level of real consumption remains constant in time.
Concerning the relationship between private and public consumption , we obtain from the optimality condition:
In the particular case when the utility functions U and V are of Bernoulli type: 
relation ( 
From relation (39) we deduce that the level of public consumption is lower than the level of private consumption if the following relations are satisfied: Next, we will derive the relations between the size of the private capital, the nominal interest rate, i , and the fiscality rate, τ .
From the dynamics equations (22), (24) and (25) of the dual variable we obtain:
From we obtain the following condition:
Relation (44) expresses the fact that the level of the capital has to be chosen in such a way that the marginal productivity,
, adjusted with the fiscality rate
, has to be higher than the nominal interest rate, .
From relation (42) we also obtain the following formula, which gives the optimal level of the capital:
From relation (45), it follows that the level of the private capital increases if the nominal interest rates or decrease, or if the fiscality rate
As concerns the optimal level of the stock of nominal government debt , we have the formula:
Formula (46) points out the fact that the size of the stock of nominal government debt depends on private wealth , on the size of the stock of money, , on the nominal interest rates, and and on the fiscality rate,
To deduce the dynamic equation of the nominal interest rate, we will take into account the relation:
Using relation (47), from (43) it follows:
From relation (48), which represents the dynamic equation of the nominal interest rate, it follows that decreases if increases or if the fiscality rate
Finally, we will show that if relation (30) is satisfied, which insures that the levels of real private consumption are equal in the periods t-1 and t (according to relation (31)) and if the nominal interest rate satisfies the condition 
Transversality Conditions
For the optimal trajectories the Maximum Principle provides the following transversality conditions:
From the dynamic equation (25) 
This means that the sequence should increase slower than the sequence . 
Next, we will take a look at the information provided by the transversality condition (52).
From relations (22) and (24), it follows: 
which, taking into account (42). becomes: 
and the transversality condition (52) will coincide with (58). So, if the monetary policy ensures a constant nominal interest rate , the transversality condition (52) is automatically satisfied.
